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JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann., §54-1-2.5 provides that the Public Service
Commission (••Commission11) shall comply with the requirements of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act in its adjudicative proceedings.
Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-16(l) further provides that the Utah
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

Moreover, this

Court has jurisdiction over final orders issued by the Commission
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(i).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

DOES THE COMMISSION HAVE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SALE
OF WATER OUTSIDE OF SANDYS MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES?

II.

DID THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINE
THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEMS
THAT SERVE NON-CITY RESIDENTS?

III.

DID THE COMMISSIONS REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF THE PARTIES' RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS?

IV.

IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The Commission

issued an Order determining that it has

jurisdiction to regulate Sandy City's sale of water to nonresidents living in the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County.
The final Order contains Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
support of its determination. White City and Sandy allege that the
Order was issued without an evidentiary hearing and lacks a factual
basis.

The proceedings before the Commission were "formal11 and

review on appeal is limited to the administrative record.
appropriate standard of review under the Utah Administrative

The

Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-16, is the "substantial
evidence" standard.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioners, White City Water Company and Sandy City, appeal
from a final Order issued by the Commission finding that it has
jurisdiction to regulate Sandy's sale of water to non-resident
customers. The Commission's Order bifurcated the issue of the
Commission's

jurisdiction from the issue of approval of the

contract for the sale of the stock of White City to the Municipal
Building Authority of Sandy City.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The White City Water Company

("White City") is a water

corporation, as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. §54-2-1(34) ,
and is regulated by the Commission as a public utility. White City
filed an Application with the Commission to approve a contract with
Sandy City, a municipal corporation ("Sandy"), under the terms of
which, White City would transfer all of its outstanding stock to
the

Municipal

Authority").

Building

Authority

of

Sandy

In its Application, White

City

City

("Building

also

seeks a

determination that after the transfer, the water system will
constitute a municipal water system not subject to the regulation
of the Commission.
Some time after the Application was filed with the Commission,
the White City Water Users, Salt Lake County and Sandy filed
petitions to intervene in the proceedings. The Commission allowed
intervention and the parties subsequently submitted memoranda in
2

support of their respective positions regarding the proposed sale
and the issue of the Commissions continuing jurisdiction.

The

Commission subsequently issued an Order bifurcating the issue of
the Commissions jurisdiction and the issue of the public interest
of the contract, finding that it has jurisdiction over Sandy's sale
of water outside of its municipal boundaries to residents of the
County.
Following entry of the Order, White City and Sandy filed
Petitions for Review and/or Reconsideration. The Commission denied
the Petitions because they failed to raise issues not previously
considered.

White City filed a Petition for Review in this Court

seeking a review of the Commission's Order.
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition.
denied

the

motion

and

reserved

Sandy subsequently

Thereafter, this Court

the

issues

for

further

consideration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 4, 1991, White City filed an Application

("Application") advising the Commission that it had entered into an
agreement with Sandy City and the Building Authority to sell all of
its stock to the Building Authority.
and operate the water system.
2.

The

Application

Sandy City would then lease

(R. 79).

contained

the

following

material

representations of fact, among others:
a.

White City is a corporation organized under and

pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah and having its

3

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

(R. 79).

b.

Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized and

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah
and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake County,
Utah.

(R. 79).

c.

The Building Authority is established and created

pursuant to Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, as amended.
d.

(R. 79).

On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City and the

Building Authority entered into a contract with White City
whereby Sandy City, through its building authority, will
acquire the stock of White City, pursuant to certain terms and
conditions set forth in the contract.
e.

(R. 79).

White City holds Certificate of Convenience and

Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public Service Commission of
Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955.
f.

(R. 80).

The described geographical area is contiguous and

lies partly within Sandy and partly within the unincorporated
area of Salt Lake County.
customers

plus

connected.

83

lines

White City has approximately 3650
to

residential

lots,

not

yet

42% of the connections are within the city limits

of Sandy and 58% are in contiguous unincorporated Salt Lake
County.
g.

(R. 81).
As part of the terms of the Agreement, White City

will remain intact as a corporation over the life of the bonds
4

which the Building Authority proposes to issue to raise
capital for the acquisition of the stock of White City.
Sandy, however# will operate the two systems on an integrated
basis and requested an order from the Commission to the effect
that such an integrated system will be considered a municipal
system in its entirety under the laws of the State of Utah and
thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S17A-3-914(3) from
the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of Utah.
(R. 84).
3.

On November 7, 1991, Sandy sought permission to intervene

(R. 143) and in late November, 1991, White City water users
petitioned to intervene.

(R. 150).

On December 9, 1991, the

Commission held a prehearing and granted the proposed intervention
of Sandy and White City water uses.
4.

The

Commission

(R. 158).

conducted

a

prehearing

conference

December 9, 1991, when it set a discovery schedule and asked the
parties to brief the legal authority of the Commission over the
rates and service which may ultimately be provided to White City
customers residing outside the boundaries of Sandy.
5.

(R. 164).

Salt Lake County petitioned to intervene on December 26,

1991 and intervention was granted on January 10, 1992.
6.

Oral

arguments

February 18, 1992.
7.

were

heard

by

the

(R. 164).

Commission

on

(R. 302).

The parties to the proceedings before the Commission

submitted briefs, memoranda of law, briefs in response and briefs

5

in reply, including attachments and exhibits, on the issue of the
Commission's jurisdiction.
8.

(R. 175 to 300).

On February 20, 1992, the Commission issued its Order and

severed the prayer for relief on the issue of the Commission's
jurisdiction over Sandy after the sale from the balance of the
proceedings and assigned that matter a separate docket number (No.
91-018-02).

The Commission denied the prayer for relief on the

jurisdictional issue; and found that it has jurisdiction over Sandy
to the extent that it provides retail water service beyond its
boundaries as a general business.
9.

(R. 341).

The Commission's Order contained the following Findings

of Fact:
a.

Applicant,

White

City,

certificated by this Commission.

is a water

corporation

In its Application, White

City seeks approval of a transfer of all its outstanding stock
to an instrumentality of Sandy, a Utah municipal corporation.
White City further seeks declaratory relief in the form of a
Commission declaration that "the integrated system constitutes
a municipal water system under the laws of the State of Utah."
(R. 341).
b.

Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would

be transferred to the Building Authority.

White City would

retain its corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds
issued by the Authority to finance the purchase.
c.

(R. 342).

White City would cease operating the system and, for

a nominal rental, would lease the system to the Building
6

Authority, which in turn would sublease to Sandy. Sandy would
actually operate the system and, to the extent feasible, would
integrate White City's present system with Sandy's municipal
system.

Payment to the bondholders would be made by the

Authority out of rentals realized from the sublease to Sandy,
which in turn proposes to pay the rental fees out of water
charges to customers.
d.

(R. 342).

In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers

residing outside the city limits will be charged more than
those residing within.

The stated rationale is that the

customers outside the city limits should bear a greater
proportion of the costs of the acquisition.
e.

(R. 343).

In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically

conditioned upon this Commission's final Order declaring that
the

Commission

does

not

have

and

jurisdiction over Sandy, whether

will

assert

any

in regard to customers

residing inside or outside the city limits.
10.

not

(R. 343).

Following the entry of the Commission's Order, White City

and Sandy filed Petitions for Review and/or Reconsideration with
supporting memoranda.
11.

The

(R. 360 through 388).

Commission

subsequently

issued

an

Order

on

April 8, 1992, denying review because the Petitions failed to raise
issues not previously considered.
12.

(R. 389).

White City filed a Petition for Writ of Review in this

Court on April 30, 1992, seeking a review of the Commission's
Order.

(R. 394).
7

13.

Sandy City subsequently filed a Motion

for Summary

Disposition on June 15, 1992, claiming that the Commission's Order
was not a final cippealable order and alleging manifest error.
(R. 453).
14.

This Court denied the Motion for Summary Disposition and

reserved the issues for further consideration on August 28, 1992.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission properly determined that it hcts jurisdiction to
regulate Sandy's sale of water to non-resident customers.
Commission

bifurcated

the

issues of

jurisdiction

The

and public

interest, and the Commission's order on jurisdiction is a final
appealable order.
The public interest demands regulation of the sale of water
beyond

municipal

boundaries

in

order

disenfranchisement of non-resident customers.

to

avoid

the

The majority (58%)

of White City's connections serve customers in the unincorporated
area. If it is determined that after the sale, the Commission will
not have jurisdiction over the sale of water to non-resident
customers, they will be deprived of both political and regulatory
recourse against Sandy.
The Commission properly determined that the sale of water to
non-resident customers is not a protected municipal function.
Sandy may sell surplus water without regulation. Surplus water is,
by definition, limited in both quantity and dureition.

Sandy can

terminate service to non-residents without notice any time the
demand for suplus water in the city exceeds supply.
8

Sandy intends to acquire the White City system for the purpose
of re-selling water as a general business. The re-sale of water to
non-resident customers is not merely incidental to its own use, and
is not protected as a municipal function.

The constitutional

prohibition on the exercise of jurisdiction over a city/s municipal
functions does not, therefore, apply.
The issue of the public interest of the proposed contract is
separate and apart from the jurisdictional matter and was assigned
a separate docket number by the Commission.

The matter of the

Commission's jurisdiction over Sandy after the sale must be finally
resolved before the issue of the public's interest in the contract
can be determined.
The final order provisions contained in Rule 54(b) of the
Rules

of

Civil

proceedings.

Procedure

do

not

apply

to

administrative

The Commission satisfied the Utah Administrative

Procedures Act's ("UAPA") requirements, including the exhaustion of
remedies provision.

The procedural requirement of a final order,

if any, was satisfied and this matter is properly before the Court
on appeal.
The Commission's refusal of an evidentiary hearing did not
constitute a denial of the parties' rights to due process. White
City relied on the facts contained in its Application and requested
the Commission to make a legal determination on its jurisdiction
based solely on those facts. The appropriate standard of review on
appeal is the whole record standard, because White City and Sandy
allege the Commission's order was issued without an evidentiary
9

hearing and, therefore, lacks a factual basis. A comparison of the
facts contained in the Application and the Commission's findings of
fact, establishes that sufficient uncontroverted facts exist in the
record as a whole to support the Commission's order.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEMANDS REGULATION OF THE SALE OF
WATER OUTSIDE OF SANDY'S MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES.

Salt Lake County ("County") intervened in the proceedings
before the Commission to represent its interests and the interests
of residents of the unincorporated County served by White City. In
addition to the fact that the County

owns property

in the

unincorporated areai served by White City, the County's interests in
the sale of the water system to Sandy include: the potential
disenfranchisement

of

non-residents;

the

likelihood

that

differential rates will be established for residents and nonresidents; the availability of adequate service after the sale;
and, the possibility that Sandy will use water service as leverage
to force an involuntary annexation of unincorporated areas served
by the system.
A.

LIKELIHOOD OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND DIFFERENTIAL
RATES.

Paragraph six of White City's Application (sometimes referred
to as the "Petition") for approval of the Contract of Sale,
describes the affected service area as follows:
The above described geographical area is
contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City
and partly within the unincorporated area of
Salt Lake County. White City Water Company
has approximately 3650 customers plus 83 lines
to residential lots, not yet connected. 42%
10

of the connections are within the city limits
of Sandy City and 58% are in contiguous Salt
Lake County, (Emphasis added). (R. 81).
The County clearly has an interest in this matter because the
majority (58%) of White City's connections serve residents of the
unincorporated contiguous areas.
The White City system is regulated by the Commission, and
residents in the unincorporated area of the County served by the
system have recourse to the Commission.

If Sandy acquires the

system, and it is determined that the Commission does not have
jurisdiction

to

regulate

service

beyond

Sandy's

municipal

boundaries, the non-residents will no longer have a forum to hear
their grievances, including such matters as the setting of rates,
the quality of service and similar issues.
The issue of representation is significant because Sandy has
explicitly stated that customers residing outside of its municipal
boundaries will be charged more than those residing within the
City.

(Finding of Fact #4.

R. 343).

Obviously, non-residents

cannot vote in City elections and will have no voice or control
over the affairs of the City.1
In an analogous case, CP National Corporation v. Public
Service Commission. 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that
Utah Code Ann., §10-8-14 allows the incidental disposal of utility
surplus, but does not allow the continuing distribution of power
1

The record contains a number of letters from individual
residents of the unincorporated area opposing the sale to Sandy.
(R. 142 through 340). Also, the Petition to Intervene of White
City Water Users describes the reasons behind local opposition to
the proposed sale. (R. 150).
11

outside of municipal boundaries. The Court explained that extraterritorial limitations are justified because municipally owned
utilities are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
but are controlled by the administration of the municipality. The
Court stated:
Customers who are non-residents of the
municipalities would be left at the mercy of
officials over whom they have no control at
the ballot box, and they could not turn to the
Public Service Commission for relief. At 524.
Furthermore, Sandy will have the ability to terminate service
beyond its municipal boundaries without notice or hearing.

This

circumstance will leave the non-residents without a meaningful
recourse to any regulatory entity, public or private. The argument
advanced by White City and Sandy in their brief, that any adverse
action taken by Sandy can be challenged in court as an ultra vires
act, provides no protection because it will force the residents of
the unincorporated area to incur the substantial time delays and
costs associated with litigation every time they seek redress.
B.

THREAT TO CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE
SERVICE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "SURPLUS" WATER.

Sandy relies on Utah Code Ann. §10-8-14(1) as authority to
construct, maintain
function.

and

operate water works

as a municipal

Sandy further relies on that section for authority to

sell and deliver surplus capacity not required by the City or its
inhabitants to others beyond the boundaries of the City.

The

critical importance of the characterization of "surplus11 water, is
that it implies the existence of a temporary excess in supply that
is not needed or required by City residents. This characterization
12

is particularly significant in Utah, an arid state where water is
a scarce and finite resource.

Surplus water must, by definition,

be considered to be limited in both quantity and duration.
This Court considered the application of §10-8-14 and the
jurisdiction of the Commission over the sale and delivery of water
beyond municipal limits, in County Water System, Inc. v. Salt Lake
City, 3 U.2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954). The Court, interpreting
§10-8-14, noted:
The water must of necessity be committed to
the use of the city when the need arises
therein. Therefore, no long term assurance of
continued supply to outside customers can be
given. At 290.
The Court relied on the temporary nature of a surplus in
support of its holding that Salt Lake City was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission for certain purposes. Likewise, in
CP National Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519
(Utah 1981) the Court observed that §10-8-14 does not contemplate
continuing utility service beyond municipal boundaries because
municipally owned utilities are not subject to regulation by the
Commission.
The temporary nature of surplus water was again underscored by
this Court in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119
(Utah 1977).

In that case, the Court considered Salt Lake City's

ability to extend water service beyond its municipal boundaries.
The Court noted that the City had no binding obligation to continue
service to non-residents.
Corp..

724

P.2d

958

Moreover, in Thompson v. Salt Lake Citv

(Utah

1986),
13

the

Court

ruled

that

a

municipality operating a waterworks is not obligated to provide
service to all members of the public, including resident property
owners.
Given the tentative nature of surplus water and the lack of
any continuing obligation of Sandy to provide service beyond its
municipal boundaries, a very real threat exists to the continued
availability of adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates.
As a result, the health, safety and general well being of nonresidents is at risk. Among other things, the County is concerned
about the availability of water in sufficient quantities and
pressures to provide adequate fire protection in the affected
unincorporated areas.
these unincorporated

Because the County provides services in
areas, it has a legitimate

interest in

assuring that adequate water service is not jeopardized.
The County also has an interest in making sure that the
existing infrastructure for water is not dismantled and sold to
another political subdivision for a purpose unrelated to providing
adequate water service. If, for example, Sandy acquires the White
City system, it may use the threat of terminating service to nonresident customers as leverage to force an involuntary annexation
of the unincorporated areas currently served by White City.
II.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER WATER SUPPLIED TO NON-RESIDENTS.
A.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENTS
IS NOT A "MUNICIPAL" FUNCTION.

Sandy proposes to extend water service beyond its municipal
boundaries to non-resident customers living in the unincorporated
14

area of the County.

These customers are now served by the White

City Water Company, which is currently regulated by the Commission.
Sandy has gone on record stating that it intends to charge higher
rates to non-residents.
municipal

boundaries

(R. 194). By extending service beyond the
at

rates higher

than

those

charged

to

residents, Sandy will be performing more as a traditional utility
than a municipal corporation.2
As previously noted, Utah Code Ann. §10-8-14(1) permits a city
to sell its surplus beyond corporate limits. The acquisition of a
water system for the sole purpose of reselling water to nonresidents is another matter. In County Water System. Inc. v. Salt
Lake City. 3 U.2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), this Court found
that Salt Lake City could acquire, own, control and manage a water
system and could sell any surplus beyond its corporate limits. The
Court noted, however, that the ability to sell water beyond its
corporate limits was incidental to the use of water for its own
purposes.
The Court observed that the incidental sale of surplus water
was not intended to permit the City to purchase water solely for
resale,

nor

"...to

construct,

own

or manage

facilities

and

equipment for the distribution of water outside of its city limits

2

Utah Code Ann., §54-2-1(19)(f) regulates the sale of surplus
capacity from any person or corporation not engaged in business as
a public utility to a regulated utility.
Before approving a
contract for the sale of the surplus, the Commission must
determine, after a public hearing, whether the contract is in the
public interest. By analogy, the same regulatory concern regarding
the public interest should apply to the extraterritorial sale of
surplus water by a municipality.
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as a general business."

At 290.

The Court went on to note that

due to the temporary and incidental nature of the sale of surplus
water, it did not believe that regulation by the Commission was
necessary.
In Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119 (Utah
1977), this Court found that in furnishing water to its residents
and to others incidentally, the City was not subject to regulation
by the Commission.

The Court went on to note, however, that the

extent to which a city may engage in rendering a utility service
outside of its city limits without being subject to some public
regulation "is not so clearly determined."

At 122.3

Given the

fact that 58% of the connections serve non-residents, Sandy's
acquisition of the White City system is not merely incidental to
the City's own use.4
If Sandy intends to sell surplus water, it can terminate
service to non-residents, without notice, any time the demand for
water in the City e.xceeds the supply. If, on the other hand, Sandy
intends to sell something more than a temporary excess of supply,
it will violate the surplus sale provision of the statute.

Sandy

3

The Commission's Order cited the Salt Lake County case in
its Order and observed that the Supreme Court remanded the case for
a determination on the issue of Salt lake City's amenability to
regulation of extraterritorial service. As noted in the Order, the
subsequent course of that litigation is unknown. (R. 353).
4

As noted in the Commission's Order, the Building Authority
is involved in the transaction only in a "belt and suspenders"
attempt to insulate the real principals and it has no real role or
participation in the arrangement. The limitations on the municipal
function argument, therefore, apply to the Building Authority as
well as the City.
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does not have statutory authority to sell water beyond
corporate boundaries as a general business.

its

The re-sale of water

to non-residents, as a general business, is an ultra vires act and
is not protected as a municipal function.
B.

In

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION OVER A CITY'S MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS DOES
NOT APPLY.

their

brief, White

City

and

Sandy

assert

that the

Commission is prohibited by Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah
Constitution from interfering with Sandy's municipal activities.
This constitutional
"ripper"

clause,

provision, sometimes

essentially

restricts

referred
the

to

as the

Legislature

from

delegating to any "special commission" the power to perform any
municipal function. White City and Sandy urge in their brief, that
the sale of water beyond Sandy's corporate limits constitutes a
municipal function and that Article VI, Section 28 prohibits the
Commission from interfering.
In City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d
530

(Utah

1988) ,

this

Court

rejected

any

hard

or

fast

categorization of specific functions as "municipal" or "state".
Instead, the Court advocated a balancing test which considers a
number of factors including:
...the relative abilities of the state and
municipal governments to perform the function,
the degree to which the performance of the
function affects the interests of those beyond
the boundaries of the municipality, and the
extent to which the legislation under attack
will intrude upon the ability of the people
within the municipality to control through
their elected officials the substantive
17

policies that affect them uniquely.
(Emphasis added)•

At 534.

The West Jordan case acknowledges that the State has a
legitimate

interest

in

considering

the

impact

of

Sandy's

acquisition of the White City water system on the* residents of the
unincorporated areas of the County currently served by the system.
In Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service
Commission of Utah, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990), this Court applied
the balancing test developed in the West Jordan case and determined
that

rather

than

categorizing

an

activity

cis a

"municipal11

function, the activity in question must be evaluated in light of
the purposes of Article VI, Section 28.
Here, the function under consideration is the sale of water
outside the municipal boundaries of Sandy to non-resident customers
living in the unincorporated area of the county. This function is
currently performed by White City, a water company regulated by the
Commission.

Under the test developed in the West Jordan case, the

sale of water to non-residents involves more of a state regulatory
interest than an exclusively local interest and is sufficient to
avoid the characterization of a municipal function.5

5

The Commission noted this in its Order and stated: "By
purposely acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking
over the obligation to serve 58 percent of the customers of an
existing certificated public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the
exercise of its municipal function and subjecting itself to state
regulation of rates for those extraterritorial customers surplus."
(R. 351).
18

C.

SANDY
MUST
OBLIGATIONS.

ASSUME

WHITE

CITY'S

REGULATORY

White City is a water company and operates under a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity issued by the Commission.

The

Commission regulates the service provided by White City to its
customers including, the reasonableness of rates, the adequacy of
service and other such matters. It is reasonable to conclude that
if Sandy buys the stock and takes over the service provided by
White City, it must also be subject to the same regulations.
In North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co.. 223
P.2d 577 (Utah 1950), North Salt Lake condemned the St. Joseph
Water & Irrigation Company, a water company regulated by the
Commission. The Court found that when the town condemned the water
company, the regulatory obligations imposed upon the water company
carried over and the town was required to meet those obligations.
Following the reasoning in the North Salt Lake case, Sandy
City should be obligated to comply with the regulatory requirements
imposed by the Commission, governing the extraterritorial sale of
water to non-residents.
III.

THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF THE PARTIES' RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS.
A.

WHITE CITY RELIED ON THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THE
APPLICATION AND CONTRACT FOR SALE.

White City relied on the facts contained in its Application
for Approval of the proposed Contract of Sale to Sandy and
requested the Commission to make a legal determination on its
jurisdiction after the sale based solely on those facts.
19

(R. 79).

The Application specifically requested the Commission to find that
after the sale, the system would be a municipal water system and
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

(R. 84). The

record is clear that had the Commission ruled in favor of White
City on the jurisdictional issue, White City and Sandy would not
have been concerned about the factual basis for that determination.
B.

A FACTUAL HEARING WAS NOT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION. SUFFICIENT UNCONTROVERTED FACTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION.

White City's Application and the contract contain facts
sufficient to support the Commission's decision on the issue of
jurisdiction.

The following uncontroverted facts recited in the

Application, among others contained in the record as a whole, were
specifically relied on by the Commission and incorporated in its
Findings of Fact:
1.

White City is a corporation organized under and pursuant

to the laws of the State of Utah and having its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

(R. 79).

Sandy is a municipal corporation organized and existing

under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah and is located
within the boundaries of Salt Lake County.
3.

The

Building

Authority

is

(R. 79).

established

and

created

pursuant to Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended.
4.

(R. 79).
On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy and the Building

Authority entered into a contract with White City whereby Sandy,
through its municipal building authority, will acquire the stock of
20

White City, pursuant to certain terms and conditions set forth in
the contract.
5.

(R. 80).

White City holds Certificate of Convenience and Necessity

No. 1121 issued by the Commission on the 11th day of May, 1955.
(R. 80).
6.

The described geographical area is contiguous and lies

partly within Sandy City and partly within the unincorporated area
of Salt Lake County.

White City has approximately 3650 customers

plus 83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected.

42% of the

connections are within the city limits of Sandy and 58% are in
contiguous Salt Lake County.
7.

(R. 81).

As part of the terms of the Agreement, White City will

remain intact as a corporation over the life of the bonds which the
Building Authority proposes to issue to raise capital for the
acquisition of the stock of the White City Water Company.

Sandy,

however, will operate the two systems on an integrated basis and
requests an order from the Commission to the effect that such an
integrated system will be considered a municipal system in its
entirety under the laws of the State of Utah and thus be exempt
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., S17A-3-914(3) from the jurisdiction of
the Commission.

(R. 85).

In addition to the foregoing facts recited in the Application,
Sandy's Memorandum of Law concerning the Commission's jurisdiction
(R. 191), contains additional undisputed

facts regarding the

acquisition and proposed operation of White City's system.
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A comparison of the facts contained in the Application and the
Commission's

Findings

of

Fact,6

establishes

that

sufficient

uncontroverted facts exist in the record taken as a whole to
support the Commission's decision on the issue of jurisdiction.7
IV.

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER.

The Commission's Order, issued February 20, 1992, severed the
issues raised

in the Application, involving the

Commissions

jurisdiction and the public interest of the proposed contract. The
Commission assigned a separate docket number (91-018-02) to that
portion of its Order declaring that it has jurisdiction over
Sandy's sale of water to non-residents.
The issue of the public interest of the proposed contract is
separate and apart from the jurisdictional matter and has been
assigned a separate docket number (91-018-01).
Order

The Commission's

is, therefore, final on the issue of extraterritorial

jurisdiction.
Following

the

Commission's Order, White

City

and

Sandy

separately filed Petitions for Review and/or Reconsideration (R.
360 & 362).

The Commission denied the Petitions for Review (R.

389) and White City subsequently filed a Petition for Writ of
Review with this Court.

(R. 394). Presumably, White City acted in

5

The facts contained in the Application parallel
Commission's Findings of Fact. (Compare R. 79 with R. 341).
7

the

UAPA §63-46b-10(l)(a) provides that an order shall include
"...a statement of the presiding officer's Findings of Fact based
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative
proceedings or on facts officially noted.11 (Emphasis added).
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good faith and considered the Commission's Order to be final at the
time it filed the Writ of Review.
A.

THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF A FINAL ORDER HAS
BEEN SATISFIED.

After reaching a decision, Utah Admin. Code R750-100-10(C)
provides that the Commission "shall draft a report and order, which
upon the signature of two commissioners, shall become the Order of
the Commission."

Here, the Order satisfies all of the conditions

set forth in the rule for a final order.

Furthermore, Utah Code

Ann., §54-7-10(1) provides that orders of the Commission "shall
take effect and become operative on the date issued."
B.

RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOES NOT APPLY TO THE COMMISSION'S ORDER.

In their brief, White City and Sandy represent that the
Commissions Order does not address the public interest of the
contract and the Order is not, therefore, a final order under Rule
54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
however,

because

the

Commission

follows

This argument fails,
the

procedures

and

requirements of UAPA, Utah Code Ann., Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
adjudicative proceedings. This explains why all of the cases cited
by White City and Sandy are based on appeals from proceedings in
the

district

courts,

and

not

appeals

from

administrative

agencies.8
8

White City and Sandy cite the following district court cases
in support of their contention that the Commission's order is not
a final order under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
1.
2.

First Sec. Bank v. Conlin. 817 P.2d 298 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
Olsen v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. . 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986).
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This Court addressed the application of the Rules of Civil
Procedure to administrative hearings in Entre Nous Club v. Toronto,
4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (Utah 1955), and found that the rules
[of Civil Procedure] do not apply to a proceeding before an
administrative body seeking to regulate activities burdened by the
public interest. At 672. Rule 54(b) does not, therefore, apply to
the Commission's Order.
UAPA

S63-46b-8

sets

forth

the

procedures

for

formal

adjudicative proceedings; and §63-46b-10 summarizes the contents of
a final order.

All of the procedural requirements set forth in

UAPA were satisfied by the Commission.
UAPA

contains

an

exhaustion

of

remedies

provision

in

§63-46b-14(2) and (3). This provision was interpreted in Sloan v.
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In that case,

an appeal was taken from an Industrial Commission order. The order
adopted certain findings of fact made by the administrative hearing
officer, but remanded other matters for further determination. The
Court ruled that the order was not a final order under §63-46b-14.
The holding in Sloan is distinguishable under the facts of the
present case, because the Commissions Order on jurisdiction was
severed from the contract matter and assigned a separate docket
number.
3.
4.
5.

The issue of the Commissions jurisdiction over Sandy's

Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm' n. , 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah
1991).
Webb v. Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (Utah 1991).
Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991).

All of the cases cited involved appeals from district court
proceedings, not appeals from administrative agencies.
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sale of water to non-residents was not dependent on the resolution
of the public interest of the contract. The Commission's Order is
final on the issue of its jurisdiction over Sandy's sale of water
to non-residents.
C

THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEST IS THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL.

As previously noted, the Commission follows UAPA's procedural
requirements in its adjudicative proceedings.9 UAPA distinguishes
between formal and informal adjudicative proceedings.

Utah Code

Ann. §63-46b-15 gives the district courts jurisdiction to review
informal adjudicative proceedings by trial de novo.

Formal

proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by §63-46b-16, which
provides that this Court has jurisdiction to grant relief if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that the party
seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by one of the
circumstances described in that section.
In their brief, White City and Sandy contend that the Order
was issued without an evidentiary hearing and was based on the
Commission's interpretation of constitutional and statutory law.
White City and Sandy fail to establish the absence of a factual
basis in the record and they claim, without more, that the
appropriate standard of review is de novo. The proceedings before
the Commission were formal, however, and the review in this Court
should be limited to the Commission's record, applying one of the
standards described in §63-46b-16(4).

See, Utah Code Ann., §54-1-2.5.
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Because White City and Sandy claim that the Commission's Order
was issued without an evidentiary hearing and, allegedly, lacks a
factual basis, the appropriate standard of review is described in
§63-46b-16(4)(g) as follows:
The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court. (Emphasis added)•
The "whole record" or "substantial evidence" standard of
review is described in Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d
63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . In that case, an employer petitioned for
a review of an Industrial Commission decision awarding unemployment
compensation

benefits.

The

employer

challenged

whether

the

findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence as required
under §63-46b-16(4)(g). Grace was a case of first impression for
the whole record standard of review under UAPA.

Following an

analysis of the standards relied on prior to UAPA,, the Court stated
that:
In applying the substantial evidence test, we
review the whole record before the court, and
this review is distinguishable from both a de
novo review and the any competent evidence
standard of review. Moreover, under the whole
record test, a court must consider not only
the evidence supporting the Board's factual
findings, but also the evidence that fairly
detracts from the weight of the evidence. It
is also important to note that the whole
record test necessarily requires that a party
challenging the Board's findings of fact must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting
facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. At 68.
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As more fully explained in Point III herein, the Commission's
record, taken as a whole, contains a sufficient factual basis to
support the Commission's decision of the jurisdictional issue.
White City and Sandy have failed to "marshall all of the evidence
and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence."
CONCLUSION
The

Commission's

Order was

final on

the

issue of

its

jurisdiction over Sandy's sale of water to non-resident customers
after the conclusion of the transaction with White City. The Order
is, for all purposes, final and is properly before this Court on
appeal.
The County has a substantial interest in the sale of the White
City system to Sandy not only because it owns property in the
service area, but because 58% of the connections serve residents of
the unincorporated county.

White City is currently regulated by

the Commission and its customers have recourse to challenge rates
and the quality of service.

If it is determined that after the

sale, the Commission will no longer have jurisdiction over the sale
of water to non-resident customers, they will be deprived of both
political and regulatory recourse against Sandy.
White City and Sandy rely on the statutory authority of
municipalities to sell surplus water without regulation.
concept of "surplus11 is, however, problematic.

By definition,

surplus water is limited in both quality and duration.
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The

If the

water supplied to non-residents is characterized as surplus, Sandy
can terminate service to non-resident customers without notice any
time the demand for water in the city exceeds supply. If, however,
Sandy intends to acquire the system for the purpose of reselling
the water as a general business, it is no longer performing a
protected municipal function.
The Commission properly determined that it has jurisdiction to
regulate Sandy's sale of water to non-resident customers.

The

regulation of services beyond municipal boundaries is a role
typically assumed by the state. A balancing of interests requires
that the Commission retain extraterritorial jurisdiction in order
to avoid depriving non-resident customers of both political and
regulatory recourse against Sandy.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission's Order
determining that it has jurisdiction to regulate Sandy City's sale
of water to non-resident customers living in the unincorporated
County should be affirmed.
DATED this

//

day of February, 1993.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

CR£l£ W. ANDERSQ
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SYNOPSIS
Applicant, a certificated water corporation, seeks approval of
the sale of all its stock to a local governmental entity and the
assumption of service to its present customers by a municipal
corporation. Applicant further asks the Commission to declare it has
no jurisdiction over the municipality's subsequent water service
operations insofar as they relate to Applicant's customers residing
outside the municipal boundaries.
We deem the jurisdictional
question of such importance that it should be resolved before
inquiring whether the transfer is in the public interest.
Accordingly, we sever the prayer for declaratory relief from the
balance of the proceeding and declare the Commission has jurisdiction
over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service
outside its boundaries as a general business.
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By the Commission:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The application in this matter was filed November 4, 1991. The
Commission conducted a prehearing conference December 9, 1991, and
asked

the

parties

to

brief

the

issues

of

the

Commission's

jurisdiction to approve the contract which is the subject of these
proceedings and, should the contract be approved, the Commission's
jurisdiction over Sandy City in connection with water customers
residing outside the city.

Oral arguments were heard by the

Commission on February 18, 1992.

Having been fully advised in the

premises, the Commission enters the following Report and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Applicant
Commission.

is

a

water

corporation

certificated

by

this

In its Application, Applicant seeks approval of a

transfer of all its outstanding stock to an instrumentality of
Sandy City Corporation, (hereafter "Sandy") a Utah municipal
corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the
form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system
constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the
State of Utah."
2.

Under

the

proposed

contract

terms,

the

stock

would

be

transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City
(hereafter

"the Authority").

Applicant would retain its

corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds issued by the
Authority to finance the purchase.
3.

Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a nominal
rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn
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would sublease to Sandy.

Sandy would actually operate the

system and, to the extent feasible, would integrate Applicant's
present system with Sandy's municipal system.

Payment to the

bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to
pay the rental fees out of water charges to customers.
4.

In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers residing
outside the city limits will be charged more than those
residing within.

The stated rationale is that the customers

outside the city limits should bear a greater proportion of the
costs of the acquisition.
5.

In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically conditioned
upon

this

Commission's

final

Order

declaring

that

the

Commission does not have and will not assert any jurisdiction
over Sandy, whether in regard to customers residing inside or
outside the city limits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As we view it, Applicant seeks two separate and distinct forms
of relief—approval, per se, of the contract, and declaratory relief
in regard to the Commission's jurisdiction. We deem the declaratory
branch of the proceeding so important that it should be severed from
the approval branch.
The subject transaction differs from other transfers hitherto
considered by the Commission in that the transfer is to an entity
arguably outside Commission jurisdiction. It would leave a number of
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances,
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. Given
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that stark fact, we refuse to take the "all or nothing" choice
presented

by

Applicant.

Instead,

we

propose

to

resolve

the

jurisdictional issue in this proceeding, with the docket number in
the caption above, as a matter separate from the contract approval.
In light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to
proceed or not in the approval action.
We turn now to the merits of the jurisdictional issue.
We concede at the outset that we have no authority to regulate
a municipality within its boundaries. However, we conclude that case
law, statutory law, and public policy support our authority to
regulate Sandy's water service outside its boundaries. In reaching
this conclusion, we believe the salient considerations

include

disenfranchisement

Sandy's

of

the

extra-territorial

customers,

limited statutory powers, the structure of the transaction, our
doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute
exercise of a municipal function, and our skepticism that Sandy would
indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes.
Disenfranchisement of the Customers
At present, all of Applicant's customers, inside and outside
the city limits, have recourse to the Commission to ensure just and
reasonable rates.

Absent our involvement in Sandy's ratemaking

outside its boundaries, the customers would have no means to prevent
Sandy from charging excessive rates.

In its initial brief, Sandy

states that the customers are not "entirely" disenfranchised, since
they can attend Sandy City public meetings. (Sandy, Initial Brief, at
9).

no.*
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We deem the assertion less than ingenuous.

One cannot be

partially disenfranchised; either one can vote or not.

Clearly the

customers located outside Sandy's boundaries do not have a right to
vote in Sandy City.

The opportunity to attend meetings is a poor

substitute for the right to reward or punish via the ballot.
The fact that Sandy proposes to charge a differential rate
immediately upon approval of the transaction is a strong indication
of how the "outside11 customers would

fare under the proposal.

Indeed, we can predict with considerable confidence, that in case of
conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised
customers, the interests of the former will receive priority—no
matter how vociferous the protests raised in meetings.
Limitation of Sandy's Statutory Powers
Unquestionably, as Sandy asserts, the Commission is a creature
of statute with all the limitations on power and jurisdiction that
implies. However, Sandy itself stands in much the same position; its
powers are circumscribed also. See State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d
1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).1
We proceed first on the premise that if Sandy takes over the
utility service of White City Water Company, the city must also take
on the utility's obligations.

According to our Supreme Court in

North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co. 223 P.2d 577

The Hutchinson Court actually broadened a municipality's
authority by holding that the powers delegated by the Legislature
should be liberally construed. The Court's rationale was that local
democratic institutions should be strengthened, thus empowering
citizens in regard to the local affairs most immediately affecting
them.
Were we to adopt the Applicant's position, we would, of
course, actually disempower the extra-territorial customers, running
counter to the Hutchinson rationale.
rsn

A
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(Utah 1950) , when North Salt Lake condemned a water company, it took
upon itself the obligations imposed upon the water company, including
the

effect

of

an Order

issued

by this Commission

before the

condemnation.2
Other jurisdictions have extended the principle explicitly to
include rate regulcition. For example, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss,
204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), the court held that the South Carolina
PSC had jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical
facilities

outside

its boundaries.

The

court

held

that

the

constitutional grant of Power to municipalities by the State to
operate electrical facilities was not a limitation on the power of
the State to regulate those activities through the PSC or otherwise.
It is the position of the plaintiff in the current action
that this constitutional grant of power to the
municipalities of the State to operate electrical
facilities is a limitation on the power of the State of
South Carolina to regulate those activities through the
Public Service Commission or otherwise. The writer does
not agree. He feels that the section in question was no
more than a constitutional provision to permit certain
municipal activities previously held ultra vires and that

2

At the time of that hearing the water company was a
utility subject to the rules and regulations of the
Public Service Commission and its findings and orders
were binding on the company, its successors, those
claiming through or under it, and those later dealing
with it.
* * *

If limitations were imposed on the water company in the
hearing before the Public Service Commission, then
condemnation of the property by the town would not unblock
the controls. The . . . town takes the franchise and
property subject to all burdens of furnishing water that
were imposed at the time of transfer.
Id. at 223 P.2d 577. If a previous Commission Order is binding on a
town clearly exercising a municipal function, a fortiori the town is
subject to Commission regulation when exercising a non-municipal
function.

n <:* A a
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it is not to be construed as limiting the powers of the
State to regulate such activities. (emphasis added.)
Id. at 378. It is true that South Carolina had in place legislation
specifically

empowering their PSC to regulate extra-territorial

service. The issue, nevertheless, was the constitutionality of that
legislation, and we believe there is scant difference in principle
between that case and this.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the obligations
Sandy may be required to assume is that of state regulation of rates
charged to customers residing outside the city limits.
As derogating from the foregoing analysis, we have been cited
Article XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which provides a
municipality the authority to furnish public utility services "local
in extent and use"; Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914 (3) ; the Municipal
Building Authority Act; the 1988 amended definition of "person" under
Utah Code Ann. § 4-2-2; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 which gives a
municipality authority to condemn a water system.

We do not

perceive any of these provisions as denying us authority to regulate
rates charged by Sandy for water service outside its boundaries.
Article XI, Section 5, gives Sandy the power to furnish public
utility services, but not necessarily the power to set extraterritorial rates, particularly in light of the "local in extent and
use" provision, which has no obvious meaning other than as a
reference to the City's boundaries.
Any prohibition by the Municipal Building Authority Act is
irrelevant in this proceeding.
above, the

As noted in the Findings of Fact

sole role of the Authority

is to be a conduit.

Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its own bonds. We strongly
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suspect the Authority is involved in the transaction only in a "belt
and suspenders" attempt to insulate the real principals, Applicant
and Sandy, from our jurisdiction.

We believe we are entitled to

assess the substance, not the mere form, of the transaction.

So

assessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real
role or participation in the arrangement, and its presence should be
disregarded.
It is true that in 1988 the Legislature deleted "governmental
entity" from the definition of "person."
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2

Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change,

however, does not indicate that the Legislature intended! to foreclose
our regulation of a city's extra-territorial retail water customers.
(See transcript

of the

Legislative

history

on this

amendment,

Exhibit "A" to Reply Brief, White City Water Users).
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 does give a municipality power
to

condemn

a water

system,

but

it does not necessarily

municipality power to set utility rates for extra-territorial
customers.

give a
retail

In a condemnation proceeding, a city is limited by strict

laws to protect the new owners of those systems and the citizens
served thereby.

Indeed, as noted earlier, the St. Joseph Water case,

supra, suggests that water systems acquired by condemnation carry
with them all their regulatory baggage.
Sandy does not have specific delegated authority to serve water
outside its boundaries without state regulation.

Where there are

gaps in the coverage of applicable statutes, as in the instant case,
we believe that legislative intent should be interpreted so as to

AO AO
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protect constitutional rights of citizens, which in this case are the
extra-territorial retail customers•
The Nature of the Arrangement
As noted above, Sandy has made great efforts to avoid our
jurisdiction in the way it has set up the proposed transfer.

The

elaborate

the

nature

of

the

arrangement

between

White

City,

Authority, and Sandy, renders the arrangement suspect.
Sandy's initial brief claims that neither White City, the
Authority, nor Sandy are subject to our regulation.
Brief, at 6-14) .

(Sandy, Initial

As noted above, the role of the Authority is

explicable only as an attempt to avoid our jurisdiction.

Given the

expressed intent to charge extra-territorial customers differential
rates, Sandy's good faith, in structuring the transaction as it has,
must be questioned.
Sandy is Not Performing a Municipal Function
Should Sandy provide water service to White City's extraterritorial customers, it would, to that extent, not be exercising a
municipal function.

Sandy would be acting as a traditional utility

(exercising a business function) and therefore would be subject to
regulation.
Sandy claims that Utah Constitution Art. VI, Section 28,
prohibits us from interfering with Sandy's municipal functions.
(Sandy, Initial Brief, at 7).

Obviously, we agree that we cannot

interfere with Sandy's municipal functions, but we maintain that
Sandy's proposed service to the extra-territorial customers is not a
municipal function.
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Recent Utah cases support our position.

In Utah Associated

Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298
(Utah 1990), in which Art. VI, Section 28, was at issue, the Court
discussed
Associated

the

alleged

Municipal

"municipal

Power

Systems

function"
("UAMPS")

performed
in

by

attempting

construct a utility line and to provide utility service.
resisted

the

jurisdiction

of the Commission

on

Utah
to

UAMPS

constitutional

grounds, arguing that they were political subdivisions exercising
municipal functions, even though part of their service area was
located outside, or would have a substantial impact outside, the
boundaries of the political subdivisions.
The UAMPS Court applied a balancing test first enunciated in
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d, 530
(Utah 1988).

Under that test, no particular activity conducted by a

municipality is ipso facto a municipal function for purposes of Art.
VI, Section 28.

Instead, a functional analysis is to be conducted,

considering such factors as
the relative abilities of the state and municipal
governments to perform the function, the degree to which
the performance of the function affects the interests of
those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the
extent to which the legislation under attack will intrude
upon the ability of the people within the municipality to
control through their elected officials the substantive
policies that affect them uniquely.3

3

Id. at 534. The Court went on to say the balancing test would
best serve the Constitutional purpose without "erecting mechanical
conceptual categories that, without serving any substantial interest,
may hobble the effective government which the state constitution as
a whole was designed to permit." Ibid. In the instant case, of
course, the only "substantial interest" our assuming jurisdiction
would affect would be that of Sandy in "milking" the extraterritorial customers to the maximum extent possible.
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Applying that test, the UAMPS Court had little difficulty in finding
that the construction of the utility transmission line for the
purpose of generating, buying and selling electricity across the
state was outside the ambit of Art. VI, Section 28. Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, supra, 789 P.
2d at 302.
The present proposal is closely analogous to the UAMPS case.
In particular, those residing outside Sandy stand to be severely
impacted, while our assuming jurisdiction in regard to them would
have minimal impact on Sandy's legitimate interests. By purposefully
acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking over the
obligation to serve 58% of the customers of an existing certificated
public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the exercise of its
municipal function and subjecting itself to state regulation of rates
for those extra-territorial customers surplus.
Sandy attempts to bolster its position by referring to Utah
Code Ann.

§ 10-8-14(1) concerning sale of surplus water by a

municipality.

A careful reading of this statute, however, weighs

against Sandyfs proposal and in favor of the extra-territorial
customers.
According to the statute, a city "may sell and deliver the
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not required
by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the
city. . . . "

In attempting to show that it would be serving

"surplus" water in accordance with this statute, Sandy states that it
"has more than ample capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City
customers and will therefore in fact be selling •surplus1 water to
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them upon acquisition of the White City system."
Brief, at 8) .

(Sandy, Initial

This interpretation is contrary to Utah case law on

the subject and contrary to a common sense definition of "surplus."
In support of Sandy's interpretation of surplus, it cites
County Water System v. Salt Lake City. 278 P 2d 285 (Utah 1954) and
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P 2d 119 (Utah 1977)
In County Water System, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the authority of municipalities to sell utility services beyond
its corporate boundaries was limited to the disposal of surplus
water.

Id. at 289.
In fact, after first delineating a municipality's powers of

surplus water disposal in sweeping terms, Justice Crockett, writing
for the Court, appears to have had immediate second thoughts. In his
next paragraph, he hedged the municipality's authority:
But such permissive sale of surplus water . . . is clearly
not calculated to permit the city to purchase water solely
for resale, nor to construct, own or manage facilities and
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its
city limits as a general business.
Id. at 290.
The Court also made clear its concept of surplus water—a
temporary glut occasioned by provision for prudent future expansion.
This would, according to the court, foreclose a municipality's
commitment to purchasers of surplus water for any long-term supply.
Ibid.

Under this concept, if Sandy is indeed to sell surplus water,

the extra-territorial customers stand to be left literally high and
dry in the near to medium term.
In this case, however, Sandy will not be disposing of surplus
water it now possesses—it will be surplus only by virtue of Sandy's

0359
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calculated

acquisition

customers—precisely

of

the

a

class

of captive,

situation

Justice

disenfranchised

Crockett

inveighed

against.
Sandy cites Salt Lake County, supra, for the proposition that
"[A municipality's] business in furnishing water to its residents and
activities

reasonably

incidental

thereto

regulation by the Public Service Commission."
122.

is

not

subject

to

Id. at 570 P.2d 121-

Sandy, however, fails to quote the complete paragraph. The

next, and more relevant sentence is: "But iust however great an
extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its
citv limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so
clearly determined." (emphasis added.)
mere dictum.

The second sentence is not

The case involved the propriety of a summary judgment

rendered by the district court, and the Supreme Court remanded for
determination of precisely the issue of a municipality's amenability
to regulation of extra-territorial service.

We do not know the

subsequent course of the litigation.
The Salt Lake County case evidences to us the Court's concern
with precisely the potential for abuse presented by the instant
proposal. We think it would be difficult to find a clearer instance
of a city's stepping over the boundary of legitimate surplus water
sales under the statute.
Our conclusion is strengthened by C.P. National Corporation v.
Public Service Commission. 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981),

According to

the Court,
" . . . We believe that [Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14] imposes
a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It
negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage
in the distribution of power to localities or persons
AQ
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outside its limits except to dispose of surplus.ft [Citing
County Water System, supra]. In the instant case, the
municipalities intend to continue to serve a large area
outside any of their limits. . . .
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city
to so operate its electric light and power works. There
is good justification for this limitation since
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service
Commission
but
are
controlled
solely
by
the
administration of the city or town wherein thev are
located . . . customers who are non-residents of the
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials
over whom thev have no control at the ballot box and thev
could not turn to the Public Service
Commission for
relief. (emphasis added.) (citations omitted.)
Id. at 524.
We can only add that the situation is not one whit different
when a municipality purposefully acquires an existing, regulated
water system. While there may be no explicit statutory authority for
us to assume jurisdiction, the obvious remedy for the abuse of extraterritorial customers is for us to continue to regulate their rates;
otherwise, to meet the Court's concern, the instant proposal would
have to be found ultra vires.4
If there is a common thread running through the history of
economic regulation in the United States, it is the abhorrence of
unchecked monopoly. We see no reason to suppose that a monopoly held
by a municipality over powerless extra-territorial utility customers
would be any more benevolent than a monopoly held privately. Sandy's
expressed intent to impose higher rates immediately upon the extra4

That is the course the Court took in the CP National case. The
main issue was the constitutionality of the municipalities' acquiring
an existing electrical utility by condemnation. The Court assumed
without discussion that we would have no jurisdiction over rates
charged the extra-territorial customers. One wonders if the same
result would have been reached had the Court considered the
jurisdictional issue and applied the City of West Jordan test.

02
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territorial customers is ample demonstration of the reason we are
unwilling to cede jurisdiction in these circumstances.
We conclude that in the event the proposal presented by
Applicant were to be approved by the Commission, the Commission would
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the extra-territorial
retail customers, at least to the extent of nullifying invidious
discrimination.

Accordingly, Applicant's prayer for a declaratory

judgment to the contrary should be denied.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
»

On the Commission's own motion, the prayer of WHITE CITY WATER
COMPANY, for a declaration that, should the Commission approve
a transfer of the stock of said company to the Sandy City
Building Board, pursuant to the contract delineated in said
Company's

application,

the

Commission

would

have

no

jurisdiction thereafter to set rates for customers residing
outside the boundaries of Sandy City, be, and the same hereby
is, severed from the balance of the proceeding and given the
Docket Number 91-018-02;
»

Said prayer is denied;

»

Any party aggrieved by this Order may, within 30 days of the
issuance hereof, petition for review; failure so to do will
forfeit the right to such review, as well as the right to
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

0355
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of February,
1992.

B r i a i f T.

uz7t%<\/

S t e w a r t , Chairman

?pt
J^nd^s M. Byrne,

Concessioner
Commissioner

Pro Tempore
ATTEST:
StepheA C. H e w l e t t , Commi

•/a
y\^L

Jultiie Orchard
Commission Secretatry

A9C^
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY FOR
COMMISSION APPROVAL OF A CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO ON THE 8TH DAY OF
OCTOBER, 1991, UNDER WHICH
CONTRACT SANDY CITY AND THE
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY OF
SANDY CITY, UTAH, WILL PURCHASE
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING STOCK OF
WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY

APPLICATION
Docket No.

°ll-oi$o\

White City Water Company hereby petitions and
represents to the Commission as follows:
1.

White City Wat^r Company is a corporation

organized under and pursuant to the laws of the State of
Utah and having its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
2.

Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized

and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of Utah and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
3.

The Municipal Building Authority of Sandy

City, Utah, is established and created pursuant to Title 17A,
Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
4.

On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City

and the Muncipal Building Authority of Sandy City entered

.off? 9

into a contract with White City Water Company whereby Sandy
City, through its municipal building authority, will acquire
the stock of White City Water Company, pursuant to certain
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, a copy of
which contract is marked Exhibit A and attached hereto.
5.

White City Water Company holds Certificate

of Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public
Service Commission of Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955,
authorizing the Company to:

(a)

Construct, maintain and operate a water system
consisting of a water well located in Section 8,
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian
in Salt Lake County, Utah having a capacity of
approximately 1,200 gallons of water per minute
with a pipe line leading from said well to a 500,000
gallon reservoir located in Section 9 , Township 3
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian
with a pipe line leading from said storage tank
to the area to be served with the necessary distribution
lines, service lines and other facilities to serve
water for domestic, culinary and other purposes
within the area bounded on the West by the East
line of 7th East Street, on the East by 20th East
Street, on the North by 94th South Street and
on the South by 120th South Street in Salt Lake
County, Utah.

(b)

To construct, maintain and operate such additional
wells, pipe lines and extended water system facilities
as may be necessary from time to time to adequately
serve water for domestic, culinary and other purposes
within the area above specified.
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6.

The above described geographical area is

contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City and partly
within the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County.

White

City Water Company has approximately 3650 customers plus
83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected.

42% of

the connections are within the city limits of Sandy City
and 58% are in contiguous Salt Lake County.
7.

Sandy City has constructed and maintained

a municipal culinary water system rendering service to approximately 21,050 residential, commercial, and industrial customers
within the limits of Sandy City.

The Sandy City water system

is an efficient and well-maintained system having facilities
to deliver water to its customers.

The water system at present

has facilities which are fully sufficient to provide storage
and pressure to its existing customers as well as to the customers
of White City Water Company if this contract is approved.
8.

White City Water Company has a distributing

system sufficient to serve its current customers. White
City Water Company also has water rights which during
ordinary years are fully sufficient to give adequate and
continuous water service to its customers. However, White
City Water Company lacks adequate facilities for the

-3-

assi

storage of water at a sufficient elevation to provide sufficient
pressure to adequately serve its customers and, in case
of an emergency draw down, a lack of sufficient storage
capacity to meet a prolonged emergency.

In order to adjust

for this situation. White City Water Company has arrangements
whereby it will sell certain water at its wellheads to the
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and purchase
back at a very much higher price from the Salt Lake County
Water Conservancy District water delivered at a sufficient
elevation and in sufficient quantities to provide both pressure
and adequate flow in emergency situations.

This arrangement

is an expensive one for White City Water Company as it receives
for its water at the wellhead under this contract $20.00
per acre foot while it pays for the water delivered at the
higher elevations the sum of $125.22 per acre foot. This
contract with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
is subject to cancellation by the parties. Furthermore,
the price to be charged for the water that is delivered
is almost exclusively at the discretion of the Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District.

Thus White City Water

Company is under constant threat of either discontinuance
of this service or the pricing of the service at a level
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which is unacceptable to White City Water Company and its
customers who would bear the ultimate responsibility of
paying for these services through higher rates.
9.

White City Water Company has attempted to

get permission to construct additional storage facilities
on property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of
sufficient elevation to provide adequate pressure. Sandy
City, however, has been unwilling to grant a variance from
zoning ordinances to permit the construction of such storage
facilities and this Commission has declined to use its authority,
if such authority it has, to compel Sandy City to grant
such variance. White City Water Company has explored other
sites outside Sandy City as a possible location for constructing
new storage facilities; however, all such available sites
are expensive to purchase, remote from the White City Water
Company's distribution system and its wells and would entail
the expenditure of money beyond the present resources of
White City Water Company.

If it were possible to borrow

funds for such construction, it would require substantially
higher rates from the customers of White City Water Company
in order to service the debt and amortize the investment
of such additional storage facilities.
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10.

Sandy City already has in existence or under

construction sufficient storage facilities to provide adequate
volume and pressure for White City Water Company customers
if operation of the two systems were integrated.
11.

While White City Water Company customers

now pay generally lower rates than Sandy City charges to
its customers for similar service, this situation will not
prevail for long if White City must continue to render the
service to its customers on its own.

The cost of maintaining

an aging system and the cost of required new facilities
as above described will in the near future require White
City Water Company to raise its rates substantially for
it to continue as a viable corporation.
12.

The water systems cf White City Water Company

and Sandy City are well matched for integration.

The approval

of this application is in the public interest and will result
in better service to all customers of White City Water Company
and Sandy City in the foreseeable future.
13.

As part of the terms of the agreement, the

White City Water Company wll remain intact as a corporation
over the life of the bonds which the municipal building
authority of Sandy City proposes to issue to raise capital
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for the acquisition of the stock of White City Water Company•
Sandy City, however, will operate the two systems on an
integrated basis and requests an order from this Commission
to the effect that such an integrated system will be considered
a municipal system in its entirety under the laws of the
State of Utah and thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 174A-13-914(3) from the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission of Utah.
WHEREFORE, applicant prays that this matter be
set down for hearing and that upon such hearing the Commission
approve the contract described above and find that the integrated
system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws
of the State of Utah.
DATED this

31st

day of,

Calvin L. Rampton
Attorney for White City "Water Company
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH,
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,

)

John E. Papanikolas, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says that I am the President of White City Water
Company, that I have read the foregoing Application and
that the same is true and complete to the best of my knowledge
and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ /
of October, 1991.

day

*>^JL^£„.S *&
Notary Public < = ^ ^
Residing at
^ ^ ^

***£/ **//',

My Commission Expires:
(/
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10-8-14. Water, sewer, gas, electricity, telephone
and public transportation — Service
beyond city limits — Retainage escrow.
(1) They may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment systems,
gas works, electric light works, telephone lines or
public transportation systems, or authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by
others, or purchase or lease such works or systems
from any person or corporation, and they may sell
and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of
any such works, not required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city.
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private
person, firm, or corporation to construct waterworks,
sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works,
electric light works, telephone lines, or public transportation systems ia retained or withheld, it shall be
placed in an interest bearing account and the interest
shall accrue for the benefit of the contractor and subcontractors to be paid after the project is completed
and accepted by the board of commissioners or city
council of the city. It is the responsibility of the contractor to ensure that any interest accrued on the
retainage is distributed by the contractor to subcontractors on a pro rata basis.
1983

ADDendix

3

17A-3-914. Supplemental to other laws — Nonapplicability of other laws — Validation of existing building authorities.
(1) This part is supplemental to all existing laws
relating to the acquisition, use, maintenance, management, or operation of projects by public bodies.
(2) It shall not be necessary for a public body or a
building authority to comply with the provisions of
other laws concerning the acquisition, construction,
use, and maintenance of projects, including, but not
limited to, public bidding laws and the Utah Procurement Code, where the projects are acquired, expanded, or improved under this part.
(3) No board, commission, or agency of the state,
including the Utah Public Service Commission, shall
have any jurisdiction over building authorities or
projects.
(4) No ordinance, resolution, or proceeding in respect to any transaction authorized by this part shall
be necessary except as specifically required in this
part nor shall the publication of any resolution, proceeding, or notice relating to any transaction authorized by this part be necessary except as required by
this part Any publication made under this part may
be made in any newspaper conforming to the terms of
this part and in which legal notices may be published
under the laws of Utah, without regard to the designation of it as the official journal or newspaper of the
public body. No resolution adopted or proceeding
taken under this part shall be subject to referendum
petition or to an election other than as permitted in
this part All proceedings adopted under this part
may be adopted on a single reading at any legallyconvened meeting of the governing body or the board
of trustees of the authority as appropriate.
(5) Any formal action or proceeding taken by the
governing body of a public body or the board of
trustees of an authority under the authority of this
part may be taken by resolution of the governing
body or the board of trustees as appropriate.
(6) This part shall apply to all authorities created,
projects undertaken, leasing contracts executed, and
bonds issued after this part takes effect
(7) All proceedings heretofore taken by a public
body in connection with the creation and operation of
a public building authority are hereby validated, ratified, approved, and confirmed.
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TITLE 54
PUBLIC UTILITIES

54-1-2JL Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
Except as specifically provided to the contrary in
Chapter 7, the commission shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in
its adjudicative proceedings.
1987

§54-2-1(19)(f)

(f) IT any person or corporation not en*
gaged in business as a public utility as defined by this section is able to produce a surplus of electric energy or power, gas, or
water beyond the needs of its own business
and desires to sell, exchange, deliver, or otherwise dispose of the surplus to or with any
public utility as defined in this section, the
public utility desiring to effect a purchase or
exchange of the surplus shall submit to the
commission, for authorization by the commission, a proposed contract covering the
purchase or exchange. The commission shall
then determine, after a public hearing,
whether, in the public interest it is advisable
that the contract be executed and, if not adverse to the public interest, the commission
shall authorize the execution of the contract.
The public utility shall then have the right
to purchase and receive or exchange the surplus product in accordance with the terms of
the contract. The person or corporation selling or exchanging the surplus product under
the authorized contract is not considered a
public utility within the meaning of this section, nor is it subject to the jurisdiction of the
commission.

§54-2-1(34)

(34) "Water corporation19 includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within
this state. It does not include private irrigation
companies engaged in distributing water only to
their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties,
water conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this
state.

54-7-10. Orders on hearings — Time effective.
(1) Orders of the commission shall take effect and
become operative on the date issued, except as otherwise provided in the order.
(2) They shall continue in force for the period designated in the order, or until changed or abrogated by
the commission.
1987

63-46b-&

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i)
and (ii), in ail formal adjudicative proceedings, a
hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
2\(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a
party, the presiding officer
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in
the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts
that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of
other proceedings before the agency, and of
technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the
agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose
to protect confidential information disclosed at
the hearing,
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to
preserve the integrity of the hearing.
1968

63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by
the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding' officer from issuing interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings
on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
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63-46b-14» Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies i£
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter.
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63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
to removal or placement decisions regarding children in state custody.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
,(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief^ specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
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63-46b-l& Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rale on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law,
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, isss

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals:
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
, c
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal ot
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections
(3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
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